Distinct Indiscernibles and the Nature of Identity by Thornton, Zach
 
 





A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 





















































Zachary Thornton: Distinct Indiscernibles and the Nature of Identity 
(Under the direction of Carla Merino-Rajme) 
 
There exists indiscernibles, entities that are numerically distinct but share all their 
qualitative properties. The existence of indiscernibles raises a problem for Leibniz's Law, the 
longstanding standard account of the nature of identity and distinctness which states that entities 
are identical if and only if they are qualitatively indiscernible, and distinct otherwise. In this 
paper, I aim to propose an alternative account to Leibniz's Law that explains the distinctness of 
indiscernibles. My proposal, which I will call the Modal Independence proposal, states that the 
distinctness of indiscernibles is explained by the fact that they are possibly discernible. While 
indiscernibles share all their qualitative properties in the world they reside, there are worlds 
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Imagine two iron spheres alone in the void, perfect duplicates of one another, and one mile from 
each other. Imagine that the universe they reside in is radially symmetric, so any plane drawn 
through the point halfway between the spheres will create two perfectly similar halves. The world 
we imagined contains indiscernibles—entities that are qualitatively identical.1 Let’s call this 
Black’s World, after its appearance in an article by Max Black.2 
 Black’s World is a counterexample to the standard non-trivial version of the Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles, which states that if entities share all their qualitative properties, then 
they are identical.3 Qualitative properties are properties that do not presuppose the existence of 
any particular individual; for the remainder of the paper, wherever I talk about properties without 
specification, I am talking about qualitative properties.4 The spheres at Black’s World share all 
 
1 I will be using the terms “indiscernible,” “discernible,” and “distinguish” frequently in this paper. I mean to use 
these terms in their metaphysical sense, and not in the epistemic sense that they are sometimes used. When I say that 
some entities are discernible or indiscernible, I am making a claim about whether they differ with respect to any 
qualitative property. I am not making a claim about whether we can tell them apart – the claim I am making has 
nothing to do with us or our perception. Similarly, distinguishing entities, in the sense I intend, is not to detect with 
one’s senses that two things are different. Rather, distinguishing, in the sense that I am using the term, means that 
we can explain the distinctness between two entities in some way.  
 
2 Max Black (1952), “Identity of Indiscernibles” Mind, 61: 153-164. 
 
3 Trivial versions of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles properties that presuppose identity to distinguish 
entities. For instance, haecceities are properties like ‘being identical to A’ where A is the name of some entity. 
Haecceities trivialize the PII because distinguishing entities using haecceities only shows that distinct entities are not 
identical. The fact that distinct entities are not identical is a trivial statement – one that no one would disagree with. 
The controversial version of the PII is non-trivial and does not permit properties that presuppose identity to 
distinguish entities. No qualitative property, in the sense that I am using the term, presupposes haecceities. So this 
version of the PII that limits which properties that can distinguish entities to only qualitative properties is not trivial. 
There may be even weaker non-trivial versions of the PII. These weaker versions will also be false if Black’s World 
is possible. See Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) “How not to trivialize the Identity of Indiscernibles,” In P. F. 
Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities. Ashgate.  
 
4 Another way of saying this is that qualitative properties have a completely general character. For instance, the 
property ‘being 50 miles from a 110-story building’ is a qualitative property, despite presupposing that some 110-
story building exists, because its instantiation doesn’t depend on any particular 110-story building existing. By 
contrast, the property ‘being 50 miles from the Willis Tower’ is not a qualitative property because it requires a 
particular entity, the Willis Tower, to exist. Similarly, the property ‘being identical to some iron sphere’ is a 




their qualitative properties, however, at least according to the description of the world, the spheres 
are distinct. Since the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, henceforth PII for short, is meant to 
apply to all entities, including merely possible entities, the possibility of Black’s World is 
inconsistent with the truth of the PII.5  
In this paper, I will not be arguing that Black’s World is possible, nor defending the 
arguments given by other philosophers for its possibility. I believe that Black’s World is possible 
because Black’s World is clearly and easily conceivable, and I believe this gives us a strong reason 
to believe it is possible.6 Many other philosophers have also been convinced of this by 
conceivability arguments, however, others have not been moved. In section 2, I will recount the 
argument that many of these philosophers who do not respond to conceivability arguments take to 
be the most convincing: Robert Adam’s argument from almost indiscernibles.7 While I believe the 
debate about the possibility of distinct indiscernibles raises interesting and important questions 
about the epistemology of modality, I will side-step these issues to focus on a different topic in 
this paper. Passing over this debate will allow us to focus on another set of interesting issues that 
arise only once we accept the possibility of distinct indiscernibles. 
 The topic of this paper is the nature of identity and distinctness. The falsity of the standard 
non-trivial version of the PII leaves us without an account of the nature of identity and distinctness. 
This version of the PII is part of the standard non-trivial formulation of Leibniz’s Law. In addition 
 
property ‘being identical to A’ is not a property that both spheres share, however, it is not a qualitative property. 
This definition of qualitative properties comes from Katherine Hawley (2009) “Identity and Indiscernibility,” Mind 
118 (469): pg. 102. Sometimes these properties are called pure properties, see Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) 
“How not to trivialize the Identity of Indiscernibles,” In P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, 
Properties and Qualities. Ashgate. 
 
5 There is significant debate in Leibniz scholarship about whether Leibniz meant the PII to be necessary or 
contingent. For the contemporary use that I lay out below, the PII must be necessary. 
 
6 This reason is, of course, defeasible. But without begging the question in favor of Leibniz’s Law over alternative 
account of identity and distinctness, I don’t believe there is any defeater. The way I think about the connection 
between conceivability and possibility is similar to David Lewis’s position. David Lewis argues that the 
conceivability of a world gives us some reason to believe that the world is possible, however the weight of that 
reason varies and is defeasible. See David Lewis (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell Publishing Co.: 90. 
Additionally, David Chalmers has argued that there are different kinds of conceivability, and only a certain kind 
entails possibility. See David Chalmers (2002) “Does conceivability entail possibility,” In Tamar Szabo Gendler & 
John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145—200. I am more drawn to 
Lewis’s more moderate position. However, I haven’t yet made up my mind on the issue, and nothing in this paper 
rides on my deciding now. 
 




to the PII, Leibniz’s Law is also constituted by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which states that 
if entities are identical, then they are qualitatively indiscernible. In metaphysics, Leibniz’s Law is 
taken to give a metaphysical explanation of the nature of identity and distinctness. This is to say 
that Leibniz’s law is a grounding account of identity and distinctness.8 Since the PII is false, 
Leibniz’s Law is false is well, so, without any alternatives, we are left without a grounding account. 
I believe that we have strong reasons for developing a grounding account of identity and 
distinctness. I believe that qualitative parsimony is a desideratum in metaphysics. In particular, we 
want a qualitatively parsimonious base of fundamental facts.9 The fundamental facts are facts that 
do not have a metaphysical explanation.10 A grounding account gives us a metaphysical 
explanation, or ground, of some kind of facts. Without a grounding account of identity and 
distinctness, our base of fundamental facts is less qualitatively parsimonious than if we had a 
grounding account constituted by fundamental facts we already accept. Since a grounding account 
would make our base of fundamental facts more parsimonious, we have reason to find a 
replacement for Leibniz’s Law. Additionally, Alexis Burgess argues that identity and distinctness 
facts seem redundant in our base of fundamental facts, and this gives us a reason to believe that 
there likely is a grounding account to find. She says, once all the other fundamental facts are 
established, “[i]ntuitively, the identity…facts come along for free.”11 To explain how it is that the 
identity facts come along for free, we need a grounding account of identity and distinctness.  
This literature on explaining the nature of identity and distinctness is old, however, there 
have been significant developments in the last two decades with Simon Saunders and Erica 
 
8 I prefer framing this debate in terms of grounding, however, the notion of grounding itself does not play a 
significant role in my account or the motivations of this project. The notion of metaphysical explanation or a 
deflated notion of ground would serve the purpose of framing this project just fine. I am concerned about getting a 
metaphysical explanation of the nature of identity and distinctness. The grounding accounts I present in this paper 
needn’t be committed to there being a real grounding relation to do this work. For an account of the deflated notion 
of grounding, see Shamik Dasgupta (2014) “On the Plurality of Grounds,” Philosophers’ Imprint 14: 1-28. 
 
9 Jonathan Schaffer (2009) “On What Grounds What,” Metateaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of 
Ontology, Oxford University Press: 347-383.  
 
10 I will be using the terms “metaphysical explanation” and “ground” synonymously.  
 
11 Alexis Burgess (2012), “A Puzzle About Identity,” Thought 1: pg. 90, as quoted in Erica Shumener (forthcoming), 




Shumener proposing plausible alternative grounding accounts to the PII for concrete entities. 12 
Simon Saunders has proposed that the fact that entities stand in some irreflexive relation explains 
their distinctness, and their failing to stand in any irreflexive relation explains their identity. Erica 
Shumener has proposed that distinctness is explained by entities standing in some quantitative 
relation that is not grounded in their existence, while identity is explained by every quantitative 
relation between entities being grounded in these entities’ existence. Saunders and Shumener’s 
proposals differ from the project that I will undertake in this paper. I believe that, despite the PII 
being false, Leibniz’s Law is not a complete failure. I believe that Leibniz’s Law gets something 
right: that the Indiscernibility of Identicals is correct and that many instances of distinctness can 
be explained by the fact that the entities are discernible. Neither Saunders nor Shumener’s 
proposals can capture these highly intuitive explanations of distinctness. What I will do is develop 
a grounding account of identity and distinctness that captures what Leibniz’s Law gets right and 
that explains the distinctness of distinct indiscernibles. 
 In this paper, I aim to propose a grounding account of identity and distinctness. My 
proposal, which I will call the Modal Independence proposal, or MIP for short, states that the 
distinctness of distinct indiscernibles like the spheres in Black’s World is explained by their 
possible discernibility. While the spheres are indiscernible at Black’s World, there are worlds 
where they are not. For example, there is a world where one of the spheres is cracked while the 
other is completely intact. The fact that there is some world where the spheres are discernible 
explains their distinctness. I will argue that we can give a metaphysical explanation of distinctness 
facts about concrete entities in terms of possible discernibility, and, correspondingly, we can 
explain identity facts in terms of necessary indiscernibility. 
 In section 1, I will present the proposal and some of its virtues. In section 2, I will argue 
that this proposal is a grounding account of identity and distinctness. To do so, I will first develop 
a set of adequacy conditions for grounding accounts of identity and distinctness. Then I will argue 
 
12 Like Shumener, I am limiting the scope of this account to identity and distinctness facts involving only concrete 
entities. This is to say that I am ignoring questions about what, if anything, grounds identity and distinctness 
between abstracta. I believe this is an interesting question, and if there is a completely general account of identity 
and distinctness, it will have to answer these questions too. However, answering these questions about abstracta 
would require getting too deep into the philosophy of mathematics, and would be better addressed in a stand-alone 
paper. For a paper where these questions do get asked and addressed, see Thomas Donaldson (2017), “The 




that the Modal Independence proposal satisfies all these conditions. Finally, in section 3, I will 
describe some interesting metaphysical consequences of this view and address some further 
objections in the face of these consequences. In particular, the Modal Independence proposal 
seems to imply a radical holism about modal space. I will argue that this consequence is not as 
radical as it might first appear and that there are ways to avoid it. 
 
Section 1:   The modal independence proposal 
While Leibniz’s Law fails to be a grounding account of identity and distinctness, I do not believe 
it is completely mistaken. Leibniz’s Law has been the dominant account of the nature of identity 
and distinctness because of how intuitive its explanations of identity and distinctness are. In 
particular, in cases of distinct and discernible entities, Leibniz’s Law gives the correct explanation 
for why the entities are distinct – they are distinct because they are discernible. I believe that our 
account of the nature of identity and distinctness ought to capture the fact that particular instances 
of distinctness can be explained by instances of discernibility. In this section, I will present two 
insights. The first from the success of Leibniz’s Law in explaining particular instances of 
distinctness. And the second from the failure of Leibniz’s Law to account for the distinctness of 
distinct indiscernibles like Black’s spheres. I will use these insights to construct a new grounding 
account of identity and distinctness, the Modal Independence proposal. I will then describe how 
the Modal Independence Proposal explains particular instances of identity and distinctness, 
including the distinctness of distinct indiscernibles like the spheres at Black’s World. 
To simplify this discussion, let’s define two higher-order properties – properties whose 
instantiation depends on the instantiation of other properties – discernibility and indiscernibility. 
Entities are discernible when they fail to share some qualitative property. For instance, what makes 
my coffee mug and my chair discernible is that my coffee mug has the qualitative property of being 
half full of coffee, while my chair fails to have that property. On the other hand, entities are 
indiscernible when there is no qualitative property that one has that the other fails to share.  
Now consider particular cases of distinct and discernible entities. One such case is my 
laptop and the table it is resting on. The fact that my table is made of wood and my laptop is made 




fact that these entities are discernible fully explains the fact that they are distinct, this means that 
the fact that they are discernible is what makes it the case that they are distinct – nothing more 
needs to be said about their distinctness than the fact that they are discernible. According to 
Leibniz’s Law, the fact that my table and laptop are discernible seems to just be what is it is for 
them to be distinct. I believe this claim is correct. I believe that the reason why Leibniz’s Law has 
been the only account of identity and distinctness for so long is that it gets many of the cases 
right.13  
The insight we can gain from the fact that Leibniz’s Law gives the correct explanations of 
distinctness in cases of discernible entities is that the nature of identity and distinctness involves 
the notions of discernibility and indiscernibility. So whatever the correct account of the nature of 
identity and distinctness is, it ought to involve the notions of indiscernibility and discernibility, 
and it also ought to capture the fact that particular instances of distinctness can be fully explained 
by the entities being discernible.  
 The second insight we can gain is from the failure of Leibniz’s Law to account for instances 
of distinct indiscernibles. According to Leibniz’s Law, the joint between identity and distinctness 
lies across the division between discernible and indiscernibles. However, Leibniz’s Law narrowly 
misses its mark. In non-problem cases, discernibility is a perfectly adequate grounds of 
distinctness. But when we consider problem cases – that is, when we start considering cases that 
lie close to the joint between identity and distinctness – the PII fails to give correct verdicts. Where 
I believe the PII goes wrong is that the joint between identity and distinctness runs through the 
class of indiscernibles. There are some indiscernible entities that are distinct, such as the spheres 
at Black’s World, and there are some indiscernibles that are identical.14  





13 The recent accounts developed by Saunders and Shumener cannot capture the fact that instances of discernibility 
metaphysically explain instances of distinctness. I take this to be a shortcoming of both these views. 
 
14 Unfortunately, grammar makes this sentence sound contradictory. Grammar forces me to use the plural word 










The rows of these charts represent two ways of dividing up all pairs of entities. The first row 
divides them into those that are distinct and those that are identical. And the second into those that 
are discernible, contingently indiscernible, and necessarily indiscernible. The columns of the chart 
represent the overlap in extension between the two ways of dividing up pairs of entities. Chart 1 
shows how Leibniz’s Law claims things to be; Chart 1 shows the divide between distinct and 
identical as overlapping with the divide between discernible and indiscernible. Chart 2 shows how 
things really are. The divide between distinct and identical does not overlap with the divide 
between discernible and indiscernible. Rather, there are some entities that are indiscernible but fall 
into the extension of the class of distinct. From this chart, we can see that the division between 
distinct and identical runs through the class of indiscernibles. 
The strategy that I will use to construct the Modal Independence proposal is to first divide 
the class of indiscernibles into two sub-classes with the aim of dividing along the joint between 
identity and distinctness. Next, I will find a property that unites all the distinct indiscernibles with 
the discernible and this property will be the grounds of distinctness. Then I will ground identity in 
the property that unites all instances of identical indiscernibles. This strategy ensures that our 
account keeps what Leibniz’s Law got right with respect to discernible but ameliorates where it 
has gone wrong with respect to indiscernibles.  
I believe that the way to divide the class of indiscernibles that carves at the joint between 
identity and distinctness is to divide these entities according to how they instantiate the relation of 
being indiscernible.15 Some entities instantiate are indiscernible, but only contingently so. This is 
the case when entities are indiscernible in some worlds, but discernible in other. While other 
indiscernibles are indiscernible by necessity. Let’s divide up indiscernibles into two sub-classes: 
 
15 Erica Shumener makes a similar move when developing her Quantitative proposal. She says, “we should not only 
look at which properties and relations objects have but how they have them.” (forthcoming), “Explaining identity 




contingently indiscernibles, and necessarily indiscernibles. By introducing modality into our 
account, we can adjust where we draw the line between identity and distinctness such that it carves 
right along the joint. If this way of carving up the category of indiscernibles is correct, then all 
distinct indiscernibles, such as Black’s spheres, will fall into one of these classes while all identical 
indiscernibles will fall into the other.  
 Contingently indiscernible entities are entities that are indiscernible at some worlds but are 
discernible at others. The spheres at Black’s World are an instance of contingently indiscernibles. 
This is because they are indiscernible at Black’s World but are discernible at other worlds. For 
instance, there is some world where one of the spheres is made of gold while the other sphere is 
made of iron. In this world, the spheres are discernible in virtue of their failure to share the property 
of being made of gold. Importantly, I am not saying that the spheres are contingently indiscernible 
because they fail to share all their modal properties. The spheres have all the same modal properties 
– it is possible for each of the spheres to be made of gold, to be cracked, etc. It is also possible for 
each of the spheres to gold, cracked, etc. while some other sphere is fully intact and made of iron. 
What makes the spheres contingently indiscernible is the fact that they could actualize these modal 
properties independently of one another. For example, one sphere could actualize its possibility of 
being cracked without the other sphere actualizing its instance of this modal property. So, despite 
the spheres being indiscernible at Black’s World, they are not indiscernible at every world that 
they inhabit. This is what makes them contingently indiscernible.  
 Necessarily indiscernibles are entities that are indiscernible at every world. It is never the 
case that necessarily indiscernible entities stand in some anti-symmetric relation, actualize their 
modal properties independently of one another, or exist without the other existing. This is because 
any of these things happening would make the entities discernible, and thereby they would not be 
necessarily indiscernible. Take, for instance, my cat Frank. Frank is indiscernible from himself, 
and necessarily so. He always stands in some symmetric relation with himself, he cannot actualize 
some modal property independently of himself, and he always exists together with himself. So, 
the necessary indiscernibility relation holds between an entity and itself. In section 2, I will argue 
that this relation holds only between an entity and itself. For now, let’s take this claim for granted. 
 This divide between contingently indiscernibles and necessarily indiscernibles seems to be 




we have distinct indiscernibles like Black’s spheres. On the other hand, the necessary 
indiscernibility relation holds between an entity and itself.  
 Dividing the class of indiscernibles into contingently indiscernibles and necessarily 
indiscernibles seems to carve along the joint between identity and distinctness. We can represent 
it in a chart as follows: 
Distinct Identical 
Discernible Contingently indiscernible Necessarily Indiscernible 
 
In this case, the extension of distinct entities completely overlaps with the extensions of discernible 
and contingently indiscernible entities. And the extension of pairs of identical entities perfectly 
overlaps with those that are necessarily indiscernible. The divide between entities that are distinct 
and those that are identical overlaps with the divide between those that are contingently 
indiscernible and those that are necessarily indiscernible.   
Now we must find what properties unify all the instances of identity and distinctness. In 
this case of identity, this is easy. All and only the necessarily indiscernible entities are related by 
identity, so the property of necessary indiscernibility is our ground of identity. It is only slightly 
complicated in the case of discernible and contingently indiscernibles. While not all discernible 
are indiscernible at some world, all contingently discernible entities are discernible in some world. 
The same is true of all discernible entities – discernible entities are discernible at the world they 
reside. Here then is the property that unites these two classes: these entities are all discernible in 
some world. This property we will call being possibly discernible. Since what is actual is a subset 
of what is possible, all the actually discernible entities are possibly discernible. And since being 
contingently indiscernible is for there to be some world whether the entities are discernible, all 
contingently indiscernible entities are possibly discernible. This shared feature between these two 
classes of distinct entities is our ground of distinctness. Combining this ground of identity and 
ground of distinctness into a single account, we get the Modal Independence proposal, or MIP for 
short: 
Modal Independence proposal (MIP): for any concrete entity x and y, x and y are 
identical if and only if they are necessarily indiscernible; and x and y are distinct if and 




The MIP is a grounding account of identity and distinctness that states that identity facts are 
grounded in facts about necessary indiscernibility and distinctness facts are grounded in facts about 
possible discernibility. 
 With the MIP, we can explain the distinctness between the spheres at Black’s World. The 
spheres at Black’s World are distinct because they are possibly discernible. The fact that they are 
possibly discernible is grounded in particular facts about entities failing to share some property in 
some world. So, a deeper explanation of the distinctness of the spheres is that there is some world, 
say, W1, where the spheres fail to share the property of being cracked. At W1, one sphere is cracked 
while the other is not. The fact that one sphere is cracked while the other is not at W1 explains the 
fact that the spheres at Black’s World are possibly discernible, and this fact explains why they are 
distinct.16  
 The MIP can also capture the fact that particular instances of distinctness are fully 
grounded by instances of discernibility. My coffee table and my laptop are actually discernible, 
and this grounds the fact that they are possibly discernible. Additionally, the fact that they are 
actually discernible is in turn grounded in the fact that one is made of wood while the other is made 
metal. So, the MIP captures the same intuitive explanations of the distinctness of discernibles that 
made Leibniz’s such an attractive account of identity and distinctness.  
 One might wonder why I am describing the MIP as some new account of identity and 
distinctness rather than a modified version of Leibniz’s Law. In truth, it would not matter whether 
we called it a version of Leibniz’s Law or a whole new account. This is merely a verbal difference. 
The reason why I am choosing to call it a whole new account is because, in the literature, versions 
of Leibniz’s Law is used to refer to different views that share the same logical form, but which 
differ with respect to what kinds of properties play the role of distinguishing entities. The Modal 
Independence proposal, on the other hand, has a different logical form from Leibniz’s Law. Our 
modification to Leibniz’s seems small – we have only added a modal operator to Leibniz’s law, 
and this has slightly changed the verdicts it makes about identity and distinctness As it turns out, 
this small change has significant consequences regarding the view’s commitments. In the next 
 
16 Keep in mind that the property of being possibly discernible is a property that both spheres share. So, the MIP 
does not distinguish the spheres at Black’s World by identifying some asymmetry between the spheres. Rather, the 
MIP states that there is a particular kind of relation, possible discernibility, that both spheres have to one another, 




section, I will argue that the MIP meets all the adequacy conditions that we might have for a 
grounding account of identity and distinctness. In the discussion in sections 2 and 3, I will discuss 
some theoretical commitments and metaphysical consequences that the MIP has. These 
commitments and consequences are not shared with any version of Leibniz’s Law. To avoid 
covering up the significant differences between the Modal Independence proposal and any version 
of Leibniz’s Law, I am choosing to present the MIP as a wholly new account of identity and 
distinctness.  
Section 2:   An adequate account of identity and distinctness 
In the previous section, I constructed the Modal Independence proposal, MIP, from two insights 
we gleaned from the success and failure of Leibniz’s Law. The MIP captures the highly intuitive 
explanations of distinctness that made Leibniz’s Law and attractive account while also giving 
equally intuitive explanations of the distinctness of contingently indiscernible entities. In this 
section, I will argue that the Modal Independence proposal has the features we expect from an 
adequate grounding account of identity and distinctness. First, I will lay out the three features an 
adequate account of identity and distinctness must have. Then, I will argue that the MIP has all 
three of these features.  
 In “Identity Criteria and Ground,” Kit Fine makes a distinction between two kinds of 
criteria of identity: material conditions and criterial conditions. A material condition “is one whose 
satisfaction materially implies the identity of the objects in question” while a criterial condition 
“is one in virtue of whose satisfaction the objects are the same.”17 We can extend these conditions 
to criteria of distinctness, such that material conditions state what materially implies distinctness 
while criterial conditions state what grounds distinctness. Both material conditions and criterial 
conditions give conditions that are sufficient for the instantiation of identity or distinctness. Where 
material and criterial conditions differ is that criterial conditions do something beyond merely 
stating what conditions are sufficient for identity and distinctness. The connection described by 
criterial conditions is a grounding explanation – theses conditions’ antecedent facts ground their 
consequent facts. Since the MIP is a grounding account of identity and distinctness, it must be 
giving criterial conditions of identity and distinctness rather than material conditions. But how can 
 




we tell whether the MIP is giving criterial conditions or material conditions? There is a key 
difference between these two types of conditions. Material conditions can be circular in the sense 
that identity and distinctness might be presupposed in the antecedent and still materially imply the 
consequent. For example, we can give a circular material condition for sameness of person as 
follows: if person x and person y are both Aristotle, then they are the same person. This is a material 
condition because the fact that person x and y are each Aristotle is sufficient for them to be the 
same person. However, the antecedent fact presupposes personal identity, for the fact that person 
x and y are both Aristotle is itself partially grounded in the fact that person x and y are the same 
particular person, in this case, Aristotle. So their both being Aristotle is just a token of the sameness 
of person type fact. So, the material condition for sameness of person is circular. However, this is 
not a problem for the condition, for the condition describes a material implication between being 
Aristotle and being the same person whether or not it is circular. This is impossible in the case of 
criterial conditions because criterial conditions cannot be circular. This is because the nature of the 
grounding relation prohibits the explanans presupposing the notions they are aiming to explain. 
The grounding relation is irreflexive, meaning that B cannot fully or partially ground itself, and 
anti-symmetric, meaning if A (fully or partially) grounds B, then B cannot (fully or partially) 
ground A. If the notions of identity and distinctness were presupposed by their explanans, then 
either the grounding relation would be reflexive (in the case where the explanandum is a 
constitutive notion in the explanans) or symmetric (in the case where the explanandum grounds 
the explanans). We now have two features we must find in the MIP: the MIP must give sufficient 
conditions for identity and distinctness, and these conditions must be non-circular. If the MIP has 
both these features, then it gives criterial conditions of identity and distinctness, and this is what 
we expect from a grounding account of identity and distinctness.  
 There is one more feature that we would expect from a grounding account of identity, and 
this is that the ground of identity will be an equivalence relation. The identity relation is an 
equivalence relation, meaning that it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Since identity is 
“‘nothing over and above’ the facts that ground it”, and identity is an equivalence relation, then 
whatever grounds it must also be an equivalence relation, if it is indeed identity’s full ground. This 
gives us now three features of a grounding account of identity and distinctness. These features are 
(1) the ground of identity is an equivalence relation, (2) the account gives sufficiency conditions 




identity or distinctness. In the remainder of this section, I will argue that the MIP has each of these 
conditions.  
Section 2.1:   The ground of identity is an equivalence relation 
 According to the MIP, the ground of identity is necessary indiscernibility. For necessary 
indiscernibility to be an equivalence relation, it must be reflexive, meaning that for any entity, it 
holds between that entity and itself, symmetric, meaning that if A necessarily indiscernible from 
B, then B must be necessarily indiscernible to A, and transitive, meaning that if A is necessarily 
indiscernible from B and B is necessarily indiscernible from C, then A must be necessarily 
indiscernible from C.  
 Before showing that necessary indiscernibility is an equivalence relation, it is important 
that we distinguish between the de dicto and de re senses of necessity. For some object A to be 
necessarily indiscernible from B in the de re sense means that at every world where A exists, A is 
indiscernible from B. For A to be necessarily indiscernible from B in the de dicto sense, A and B 
must be indiscernible at any world whatsoever. In this way, de re necessity is a restricted kind of 
necessity. De re necessity quantifies only over the worlds where the entity under consideration 
exists. On the other hand, de dicto necessity is not restricted in this way. We may use the term de 
dicto necessity when talking about some restricted senses of necessity, such as nomological, 
epistemic, and counterfactual necessities. The de dicto and de re distinction can be employed even 
within these restricted senses to distinguish between the sense of necessity that quantifies over all 
the worlds within the restricted class and the sense of necessity that quantifies only over the worlds 
in the restricted class that contains a particular entity.  
 Distinguishing between de dicto and de re necessity is important because the de re sense 
of necessary indiscernibility is not an equivalence relation. This is because de re necessary 
indiscernibility is not symmetric. Let’s consider two entities, Fred and Frederick.18 Fred exists 
only at worlds W1, W2…Wn. Frederick exists at all these worlds as well, and at each, Fred and 
 
18 Fred and Frederick are arbitrary entities. This means that their natures are completely generic with respect to the 
kind of arbitrary object they are. Since they are arbitrary entities, any conclusions we make about Fred and Frederick 
will be fully generalizable to all other entities. I find this method of proof using to arbitrary entities to be easier to 
read than proofs using standard quantificational logic. However, one can straightforwardly construct very similar 
proofs in quantificational logic, if one wished. For a theory of arbitrary objects and their applications in reasoning, 
see Kit Fine (1983) “A Defense of Arbitrary Objects,” Proceedings to the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 




Frederick are indiscernible. Since Fred is indiscernible from Frederick at every world where he 
exists, Fred is de re necessarily indiscernible from Frederick. However, Frederick may not be de 
re necessarily indiscernible from Fred. For suppose that there is some further world Wn+1 where 
Frederick exists but Fred does not. At Wn+1, Frederick is not indiscernible from Fred, for Frederick 
has properties at Wn+1 that Fred fails to have. Since Frederick is not indiscernible from Fred at 
every world where he exists, Frederick is not de re necessarily indiscernible from Fred. So, Fred 
is de re necessarily indiscernible from Frederick without Frederick standing in this relation to Fred. 
So, de re necessary indiscernibility is not symmetric, and therefore it is not an equivalence relation. 
 However, de dicto necessary indiscernibility is an equivalence relation. To show this, let’s 
consider Pat and Patricia.19 Suppose de dicto necessary indiscernibility is not symmetric, such that 
Pat is de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Patricia, but Patricia doesn’t stand in this relation to 
Pat. Since Patricia is not de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Pat, there must be some world 
where Patricia is not indiscernible from Pat. But if there is some world where Patricia is not 
indiscernible from Pat, then Pat cannot be de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Patricia. So, Pat 
must be both de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Patricia and fail to stand in this relation to 
her. Therefore, our supposition that de dicto necessary indiscernibility is not symmetric is false. 
De dicto necessary indiscernibility is symmetric. Now suppose that de dicto necessary 
indiscernibility is not reflexive. And further, let’s take Pat to be an entity that does not stand in the 
de dicto necessary indiscernibility relation to herself. This would entail that there is some world 
where Pat is not indiscernible from herself.20 If there is some world where Pat is not indiscernible 
 
19 Pat, Patricia, and, later, Peggy are all arbitrary objects, just like Fred and Frederick. 
 
20 According to the notion of indiscernibility I am using, when entities A and B both fail to exist at a world, they are 
indiscernible at a world. This is because when A and B do not exist at a world, neither has a property that the other 
fails to have. This notion of indiscernibility has the strange consequence that entities such as myself and my coffee 
cup are not de dicto necessarily discernible. This is because there is some world where both myself and my coffee 
cup fail to exist, and at this world we are indiscernible. While I see this is a strange thing to say, I do not think it is 
problematic.  
This might spark an objection from some readers. One might wonder how entities that do not exist at a world can 
stand in the indiscernibility relation to one another at that world. It seems that having a property or stand in a 
relation at a world would entail that the entity exists at that world. This is where we can use a familiar distinction in 
the modal metaphysics literature between a fact holding in a world and a fact holding at a world. When some fact 
holds in a world, the entities constituting the fact must exist in that world. However, when a fact holds at a world, 
this does not entail that these entities exist at that world. So, it may be a fact that A and B are indisicernible at every 
world where they don’t exist. However, this does not mean they are indiscernible in every world where they don’t 
exist. The fact at some world W that A and B do not exist in W prohibits there being any facts in W from being 




from herself, she must be discernible from herself at this world. If Pat is discernible from herself 
in this world, there must be some property that she has and fails to share with herself. But this 
would mean that there is some property that Pat both has and fails to have. This is a contradiction. 
Therefore, our supposition that de dicto necessary indiscernibility relation is not reflexive is false. 
De dicto necessary indiscernibility is reflexive as well. So, now all we have left to show to prove 
that de dicto necessary indiscernibility is an equivalence relation is that it is transitive. In addition 
to Pat and Patricia, let’s consider the entity Peggy. Suppose that de dicto necessary indiscernibility 
is not transitive. Let’s say that Pat is de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Patricia and Patricia 
is de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Peggy. Let’s also say that Pat is not de dicto necessarily 
indiscernible from Peggy so that the relation between Pat and Peggy is an instance where 
transitivity fails. This would entail that there is some world W where Pat and Peggy are discernible. 
At this world, either Pat or Peggy has some arbitrary property P that the other fails to have. Either 
case would entail that Patricia has P at W since Patricia is de dicto necessarily indiscernible from 
both. If Patricia has P at W, then this would entail that both Pat and Peggy must also have P at W, 
since both Pat and Peggy are de dicto necessarily indiscernible from Patricia. However, as we said, 
either Pat or Peggy fails to have P at W. In either case, there must be some entity, be it Pat or 
Peggy, that both have P at W and fails to have P at W. So, in either case, W contains a contradiction. 
Therefore, our supposition must be false. De dicto necessary indiscernibility is transitive. Since I 
have proven that de dicto necessary indiscernibility is symmetric, reflexive, and transitive, this 
entails that the relation is an equivalence relation. This proves that MIP has feature (1). For the 
remainder of the paper, I will drop the de dicto, and will just use the term necessary indiscernibility 
to refer to this relation. 
Section 2.2:   Sufficiency conditions of identity and distinctness 
 Next, what we want to show is that the MIP gives criterial conditions of identity and 
distinctness. To do so, we must show it has features (2) and (3), it gives sufficiency conditions of 
identity and distinctness that are not circular. First, I will argue that the MIP gives sufficiency 
conditions for both identity and distinctness, then argue that the conditions are not circular. 
 The MIP states that being possibly discernible is sufficient for entities being distinct, I will 
call this the Possible Difference as Distinctness claim, or PDD for short. We can express this 




 Possible Difference as Distinctness: ∀x ∀y ∃P ( ◇ (Px ^ ~Py) → x=/=y ) 
As it turns out, there is a very tight connection between the MIP and the widely held view called 
the Necessity of Identity. The MIP stands or falls with the Necessity of Identity; for each of these 
views, they are true if and only if the other is. I will show that they are related in this way. But 
first, I will show that the necessity of identity entails PDD.  
The necessity of identity is the standard view about the modal status of identity facts. It 
follows from two uncontroversial properties of the identity relation: its reflexivity and the 
substitutivity of identicals. The argument is just three simple steps: 
(1) ∀x x = x 
(2) ∀x ∀y (x = y→ (x = x→x = y)) 
(3) ∀x ∀y (x = y→x = y) 
(1) merely states that identity is necessarily reflexive. (2) is what is an instance of the substitutivity 
of identicals. The substitutivity of identicals states that, for any entities x and y, if x=y, then in any 
proposition <p>21 where x occurs, x can be replaced with y without altering the truth value of the 
<p>. In this case, (2) is saying that we can replace one of the x’s in ‘x = x’ with y to get ‘x = 
y’. From (1) and (2), (3) follows from classical predicate logic.22 Since the necessity of identity 
follows from uncontroversial features of the nature of identity, most philosophers, including 
myself, believe the necessity of identity is true. If, in fact, the MIP follows from the necessity of 
identity, then it will enjoy this support as well.  
 It is impossible to accept the necessity of identity without also being committed to the 
Possible Difference as Distinctness claim. To show this, let’s consider two entities A and B. 
Suppose that the necessity of identity is true, that A=B, and yet A is possibly discernible from B. 
Since A is possibly discernible from B, there is some world W where A has some property P that 
B fails to have. However, since A and B are identical, it follows from the necessity of identity that 
they are identical at every world, including W. Since A and B are identical at W, it follows from 
the substitutivity of identicals that any fact about B is also true of A. So since it is true of B that it 
 
21 The “< >” here signify a proposition. 
 




fails to have P at W, it is true of A that it fails to have P at W. However, we have already said that 
A has P at W. So, we have a contradiction. So, our supposition that there can be some entities that 
are identical but possibly discernible is impossible given the necessity of identity. Therefore, given 
the necessity of identity, if entities are possibly discernible then they must be distinct. This proves 
that the Possible Difference as Distinctness claim follows from the necessity of identity.  
 I believe that the necessity of identity is the correct view of the modal status of identity. 
However, there are some philosophers, notably David Lewis, who believe that there are contingent 
instances of identity. As it will turn out, the MIP is inconsistent with there being contingent 
instances of identity. This is because the two sufficiency conditions together imply the necessity 
of identity. Before I show this, let’s first discuss the sufficiency condition for identity. 
The MIP’s sufficiency claim for identity, which I will call Necessary Indiscernibility as 
Identity, states that being necessarily indiscernible is sufficient for being identical. This can be 
presented formally as follows: 
 Necessary Indiscernibility as Identity: ∀x ∀y ∀P (  (Px ↔ Py) → x=y) 
The Necessary Indiscernibility as Identity claim states that entities that are necessarily 
indiscernible are identical. For the Necessary Indiscernibility as Identity claim to be false, it would 
have to be the case that there are entities that are necessarily indiscernible but distinct. Arguing 
that distinct necessarily indiscernibles are impossible is very difficult without begging the question 
on behalf of Necessary Indiscernibility as Identity. Instead, I will argue that there are no good 
reasons to accept the possibility of distinct necessarily indiscernible entities.  
 At the beginning of this paper, I said that we would be assuming that distinct indiscernibles 
like Black’s spheres are possible, and we have so far ignored the arguments for this assumption. 
However, it’s now fruitful to look at these arguments to see how one might argue that there are 
distinct necessarily indiscernibles. There are two arguments that are solely responsible for starting 
the contemporary literature on the PII and this literature on explaining identity and distinctness. 
The first argument is Max Black (1952)’s conceivability argument, which starts with the easily 
conceivable two sphere world I described at the beginning of this paper and argues that the easy 
conceivability of this world entails the possibility of indiscernibles. The simplicity of this argument 




indiscernible, and that we really can conceive of this world. Altogether, I take Black’s argument 
to be successful in establishing the possibility of indiscernibles. The second is Robert Adams 
(1979)’s argument from almost indiscernibles. According to this argument, our countenancing the 
possibility of almost indiscernible entities gives us strong reason to admit the possibility of 
completely indiscernible entities as well. The argument goes as follows. Consider a world that 
contains two iron spheres that are indiscernible in every way except that one is cracked while the 
other is intact. The possibility of this world is uncontroversial. It also seems like the fact that the 
cracked sphere is cracked is merely accidental – it could be the case that the sphere was intact 
rather than cracked. But once we admit that the property that makes the almost indiscernible 
spheres different is merely accidental, we have strong reason to admit that the entities could have 
been indiscernible rather than merely almost indiscernible.23 Since these are the two most 
successful arguments for the possibility of contingently indiscernible entities, let’s consider 
whether analogous arguments can be made for the possibility of distinct necessarily indiscernible 
entities. 
Adams’s argument from almost indiscernibles cannot be straightforwardly used to argue 
for the existence of necessarily indiscernible entities. What makes the argument from almost 
indiscernibles convincing is that it starts with the uncontroversial possibility of almost 
indiscernibles and argues that our intuitions about almost indiscernibles commit us to the 
possibility of completely indiscernible entities. In the case of necessarily indiscernible entities, 
they do not exist at any world whose possibility is uncontroversial. However, one might try to 
make a similar style of argument, one that argues that if we accept the possibility of contingently 
indiscernible entities then we ought to also accept the possibility of necessarily indiscernible 
entities as well. Let’s consider a world that contains just two entangled electrons. These electrons 
are completely indiscernible, however, because they entangled, we know that if they were 
observed, they would have opposite spin properties. So, the entangled electrons are contingently 
indiscernible. Now the fact that the laws of physics are such that entangled electrons must have 
 
23 The argument from almost indiscernibles leaves open some possible ways of resisting the conclusion that distinct 
indiscernibles are possible. But these responses are generally considered very unattractive, such as claiming that the 
cracked sphere is necessarily cracked or arguing that the cracked sphere could have been intact only if the other 
sphere also changed in some way that prevents them from being indiscernible. Even staunch proponents of the PII 
like Michael Della Rocca admit that the argument from almost indiscernibles is too compelling to resist flat footed. 
See his (2005) “Two spheres, twenty spheres, and the identity of indiscernibles,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 




opposite spin values when observed seems accidental. It seems like the laws of physics could have 
been such that when electrons are entangled, they always have the exact same spin value when 
observed. If the laws of physics were like that, then entangled electrons would not be contingently 
indiscernible, but necessarily indiscernible.  
While I believe that it is metaphysically possible for the laws of nature to have been 
different, I am skeptical that we have reason to believe that the laws of nature could have been the 
very way that this objection describes. According to this objection, the fact that we accept the 
possibility of contingently indiscernible entangled electrons and we believe that the laws of nature 
could have been different gives us reason to believe in necessarily indiscernible entangled 
electrons. However, this connection is not clear to me. This argument is asking us to reflect on the 
modal status of laws of nature and somehow this supports believing in necessarily indiscernible 
entities. However, I do not believe our intuitions about the modal status of laws of nature are strong 
enough to support beliefs about particular ways they could have been different. Our intuitions 
about the modality of laws of nature can tell us whether the laws of nature could have been 
different, but not how they could have been different. Contrast this with the argument from almost 
indiscernibles, where we have strong intuitions that the cracked sphere could have been intact. In 
this case, our intuitions tell us not only that the cracked sphere could have been different, but they 
tell us exactly how they could have been different. So, I do not believe that accepting contingently 
indiscernible entangled electrons and that the laws of nature could have been different gives us 
reason to believe that necessarily indiscernible entities are possible. 
One might try to push back on my response and argue that we can conceive of a world with 
electrons that are entangled in this way. This way of making the objection is analogous to Black’s 
conceivability argument. However, in this case, I am highly skeptical of our ability to imagine a 
world with such radically different laws of nature. Conceiving of this world with necessarily 
indiscernible electrons requires us imagining fundamental laws of nature radically different from 
our own and making judgments about possibilities based on these imaginings. What makes Black’s 
conceivability argument persuasive is that everything in the world he describes is entirely familiar. 
The spheres in the world are just like any iron spheres that you might find in the actual world. And 
the laws of nature and space where the spheres reside behave just like the actual ones do. What is 




simple and easy to conceive. The reason why I do not believe a conceivability argument for distinct 
necessarily indiscernible entities can enjoy the same success as Black’s conceivability argument 
is that a world that contains necessarily indiscernible must contain either some alien laws of nature 
or some kind of entity that does not exist at the actual world. Since worlds that contain necessarily 
indiscernible entities cannot be constituted entirely from familiar elements, I doubt our ability to 
adequately conceive of such worlds in a way that gives us reason to believe they are possible. 
The arguments that have been successful in establishing the possibility of contingently 
indiscernible concrete entities do not work to establish the possibility of necessarily indiscernible 
concrete entities.24 I doubt that there are any arguments for the possibility of necessarily 
indiscernible concrete entities.25 I don’t think anyone arguing for the possibility of necessarily 
indiscernible entities appreciates how strange these entities must be. These entities, by necessity, 
must exist together, actualize their modal properties together, and can never be on opposite sides 
of an asymmetric state of affairs. Let’s suppose there are two necessarily indiscernible spheres. It 
would be absurd if their nature prohibited there being any third object in general from existing. 
Their nature does prohibit particular kinds of objects from existing – objects with a geometry that 
prevents it from being part of a symmetric state of affairs cannot exist; this is bizarre but not absurd. 
What would be absurd is if these spheres could only exist at worlds where they were the only 
inhabitants. Now suppose that this is some third object, say, a golden sphere. In order to maintain 
the necessary symmetry of the state of affairs, this golden sphere must lie somewhere on the plane 
 
24 There are arguments for there being necessarily indiscernible abstract entities, such as the imaginary numbers i 
and -i. Since the scope of this paper is limited to explaining identity and distinctness relations between concrete 
entities, the possibility of necessarily indiscernible abstract entities doesn’t concern us. See Brandom’s paper on i 
and -i, Robert Brandom (1996), “The Significance of Complex Numbers for Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 293-315. 
 
25 A plausible existential version of Hume’s Dictum, based on the most plausible general version of the principle 
from Jessica Wilson (2010), rules out many potential counterexamples. This version of Hume’s Dictum states that 
there are no necessary existential connections between intrinsically typed entities that stand in no constitution 
relations to one another. Intrinsically typed entities are entities whose natures are defined solely in terms of intrinsic 
properties; Socrates is an intrinsically typed entity, however, the singleton set of Socrates is not because its nature is 
defined by its relation to Socrates. This principle states that intrinsically typed entities that do not stand in 
constitution relations to one another can exist without the other entity existing. If this principle is true, then all 
distinct intrinsically typed entities that do not stand in constitution relations to one another are possibly discernible. 
This means we cannot construct a world that contains intrinsically typed entities that do not stand in constitution 
relations to each other and which are necessarily indiscernible. It will always be possible for one of the entities to 
exist without the other. So, these entities would be possibly discernible. More could be said about Hume’s Dictum 
and necessarily indiscernible entities. But since the truth of the MIP does not depend on the truth of Hume’s Dictum, 
I will save these discussions for another paper. For more on Hume’s Dictum, see Jessica Wilson (2010), “What is 




that passes through the midpoint between the spheres and that is perpendicular to the plan that runs 
through the center of both spheres. When we imagine this world, it seems merely accidental that 
the golden sphere lies on this plane rather than somewhere else. However, the natures of the 
necessarily indiscernible spheres prohibit the golden sphere from being anywhere else. If the 
golden sphere moved anywhere else, the spheres would be destroyed. This is a bizarre kind of 
entity, and it is not a cost of the MIP that the proposal rules that these entities are impossible. Given 
the lack of argument for the possibility of necessarily indiscernible concrete entities and the strong 
independent reasons for accepting the MIP, we should disbelieve in the possibility of necessarily 
indiscernible concrete entities.26  
 The two sufficiency claims made by the MIP together imply the necessity of identity. For 
suppose these two claims are true and yet the necessity of identity is false. Then there would be 
some entities A and B that are identical at the actual world W1 but distinct at some other world 
W2. Since possible discernibility implies distinctness, A and B cannot be possibly discernible at 
W1. If they are not possibly discernible at W1, then they must be necessarily indiscernible at W1. 
And if they are necessarily indiscernible at W1, then they are necessarily indiscernible at all worlds, 
including W2. But if they are necessarily indiscernible at W2, then they must be identical at W2. 
However, this makes A and B both identical and distinct at W2. This is a contradiction. So, our 
supposition that the MIP can be true while the necessity of identity is false must be mistaken. So, 
the truth of the MIP entails the truth of the necessity of identity. This marks the first major 
commitment of the MIP. By accepting the MIP, we are committed to the necessity of identity as 
well. Since many philosophers already believe the necessity of identity, this is not a significant 
cost for them.27 However, this will be a cost to philosophers who are otherwise open to the 
contingent identity view. 
 
 
26 Accepting the MIP requires us to disbelieve, rather than refrain judgment about, the possibility of necessarily 
indiscernible concrete entities because the MIP entails that these kinds of entities are impossible.  
 
27 Some people treat every theoretical commitment as a cost. I think this is a mistake. If we believe undertaking 
systematic metaphysics is a valuable project, then we cannot treat commitments are universally bad. In the project of 
systematic metaphysics, theoretical commitments can be something that counts in favor of the view. While I am not 
undertaking a project of systematic metaphysics in this paper, I believe that the MIP has a place in a systematic 





Section 2.3:   Resolving circularity worries 
 So far, we have shown that the MIP has features (1) and (2) – the necessary indiscernibility 
relation is an equivalence relation and the MIP gives plausible sufficiency conditions for both 
identity and distinctness. What we have left to show is that the sufficiency conditions are not 
circular. As we saw earlier with the Aristotle material criterion for sameness of person example, 
giving mere sufficient conditions is trivial. Avoiding circularity is the crux of any proposed 
grounding account of identity and distinctness. Showing that the MIP is not circular will occupy 
us for the remainder of this section. 
 An account of identity and distinctness is circular if it somehow presupposes the notions 
of identity and distinctness. There are two ways that an account can be circular. The first way is 
that one of the account’s constitutive notions is grounded in the notion of identity or distinctness. 
In this case, the MIP has three constitutive notions: discernibility, entities, and modality. If either 
of these notions were grounded, even partially, in identity or distinctness, then the MIP as a whole 
would be at least partially grounded in identity or distinctness and therefore would be circular. The 
second way that the account might be circular is if defending the account from potential problem 
cases or counterexamples requires relying on the notions of identity and distinctness. An 
explanation of identity and distinctness must be dialectically defensible on its own. If defending 
the MIP from problem cases required employing the notions of identity and distinctness, then it 
cannot be a grounding account of identity and distinctness. 
Section 2.3.1:   Resolving circularity in constitutive notions 
 To show that none of the MIP’s constitutive notions are grounded in identity or 
distinctness, we must show that neither entities, discernibility, nor modality is grounded in, or 
presupposes, identity and distinctness. Let’s discuss each of these in turn. 
 I will use the term individuals to refer to entities that are primitively individuated. The 
nature of individuals is primitively particular, each one is unique in an unanalyzable way. If there 
were such things as individuals, then these entities ground identity and distinctness. Being different 
individuals would make for distinctness and being the same individual would make for identity. I 




odd entity of an individual. So, to have a non-trivial grounding account, the notion of entity I am 
employing in the MIP cannot be the notion of an individual.28 
The nature of entities contained in the MIP is completely general – entities in this sense are 
not particularized in the way that haecceities are. Still, one might worry that the notion of entities 
presupposes identity or distinctness, for entities in general have identity and distinctness 
conditions. And while this is true, I believe it is a mistake to think that the MIP is circular for this 
reason. The MIP aims to state what the identity and distinctness conditions of entities are. The use 
of the notion of an entity in the proposal is merely to fix what the proposal is about. The truth of 
the proposal does not rely on employing the notion of identity and distinctness implicit in the 
notion of entities. Rather, the role of the notion of entities in the proposal is merely fixing the 
subject matter, and so the MIP employing this notion does not make the proposal circular. 
 At the beginning of 1, I defined discernibility as follows: for entities x and y to be 
discernible, either x or y must have a property that the other fails to have. Like the notion of entities, 
the notion of discernibility is a constitutive feature of the PII. So, if the PII is not circular, then the 
MIP will not be circular because it contains the notion of discernibility. However, one might raise 
the following worry about the circularity of both proposals. The notion of discernibility is 
grounded in the notion of failing to share a property. One might worry that the notion of failing to 
share a property is itself grounded in identity. This is because the fact that there is some property 
that x fails to share with y seems to be grounded in the fact that there is some property P that either 
x or y has that is not identical to any property that the other has. In this way, identity seems to be 
playing a role in the notion of discernibility.  
 While it is true that identity is grounding discernibility and indiscernibility, this is not the 
kind of identity that the MIP is aiming to explain. The kind of identity that grounds discernibility 
and indiscernibility is property identity. The MIP only aims to give a grounding explanation of 
identity between concrete objects. And while the metaphysics of properties is a complicated topic, 
it is generally agreed that properties are not concrete entities. Properties are instantiated in concrete 
entities – they themselves are not concrete entities. So, this fact that concrete entity identity is 
partially grounded by property identity does not make the MIP circular. It merely states property 
 
28 Shamik Dasgupta shows that individuals are physically redundant and empirically undetectable in his (2009) 




identity is in a sense the more fundamental kind of identity. We can accept that concrete entity 
identity is grounded in property identity while still reducing the number of kinds of fundamental 
facts and making explicit the nature of concrete entity identity and distinctness. So, the fact that 
concrete entity identity is grounded in property identity is not a problem for the MIP. 
 The third and final constitutive notion of MIP is modality – more specifically, the notions 
of possibility and necessity. Some philosophers take possibility and necessity to be primitive 
notions, this view I will call modal primitivism. However, it is more common for philosophers to 
ground these modal facts in some other more fundamental facts, such as facts about possible 
worlds. While there are some philosophers who give accounts that reduce possibility and necessity 
to facts other than possible worlds, possible worlds accounts of modality are by far the most widely 
accepted theories of modality, so I will focus on only those.29 Among the possible worlds reduction 
theories of modality, there are multiple theories about the nature of worlds, and about how worlds 
represent modality de dicto. While I think that debates about the nature of worlds are important in 
other contexts, I do not believe it has any bearing on our current investigation. However, theories 
about representation de dicto are very important for developing our proposal, for the MIP relies on 
representation de dicto and therefore the background theory of representation de dicto cannot 
presuppose identity and distinctness. There are two main theories of representation de dicto – trans-
world identity and counterpart theory. I will first argue that trans-world identity presupposes 
identity in a way that makes employing this theory of de dicto representation in the MIP circular. 
I will then argue that counterpart theory is an alternative theory of de dicto representation that does 
not lead to circularity problems.  
 On a possible worlds account of modality, there is a plurality of possible worlds populated 
by possible individuals. These possible worlds represent the way that the world could be. Here, a 
question arises. How do these possible worlds and possible individuals represent the way the actual 
worlds and individuals could be? Answering this question requires giving a theory of de dicto 
representation. On the trans-world identity account, the possible individuals are identical to actual 
individuals, such that it could have been the case that, for instance, Hubert Humphrey could have 
 
29 Other kinds are facts about essences (Fine’s essence and modality), and Boris Kment thinks possibility and 
necessity arise from counterfactual reasoning, which itself tracks explanatory relations (Modality and Explanatory 
Reasoning). Kit Fine (1994) “Essence and modality,” Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16. Boris Kment (2013) 




won the 1968 election because there is a possible world where Hubert Humphrey himself won the 
1968 election. Similarly, in the case of the spheres in Black’s World, the possibility of the spheres 
being discernible is represented by a possible world where the spheres themselves are discernible. 
Counterpart theory, on the other hand, states that representation de dicto is explained by 
counterpart relations between individuals at possible worlds. It is Humphrey’s counterpart 
winning, rather than Humphrey himself, that represents the possibility that Humphrey could have 
won, rather than Humphrey himself winning. 
 One might argue that the trans-world identity theory does not presuppose identity. Sure, 
“identity” appears in the name of the theory. However, this is misleading. On the trans-world 
identity theory, the formal statement “diamond (Pa),” where a is the name of an entity, is analyzed 
into “∃W (Pa@W).” Identity does not show up in this analysis. So, one might believe the trans-
world identity theory does not presuppose identity. 
 The problem with this argument is that the use of a name in the analysis is obfuscating 
what is happening at the level of objects in the world. The name tracks an individual from one 
world to the next. It can track the individual in one of two ways. Either it is tracking an individual, 
a primitively individuated individual, as it occurs across worlds, or it is tracking identity relations 
between across worlds. If it were tracking individuals, then there is some entity with a particular 
nature that we can call ‘a’ that is being referred to by the name “a”. The name “a” then tracks the 
individual ‘a’ as it is instantiated across worlds. As I said earlier, I am assuming that there are no 
individuals, as the existence of individuals would undermine the purpose of giving a grounding 
account and are an otherwise unattractive ontological commitment. So, the name must be tracking 
identity relations across worlds. A more accurate analysis of “diamond (Pa)” is “∃W1 ∃y (y=a & 
Py@W).” In this case, identity does show up in the analysis. So, the name trans-world identity is 
not misleading, and the view does, indeed, presuppose concrete object identity. Therefore, the MIP 
is not consistent with the trans-world identity account of de dicto modality.  
 In contrast, counterpart theory does not presuppose identity or distinctness. According to 
counterpart theory, representation de dicto is determined by a counterpart link between the 




representing.30 The counterpart link between the represented and representing worlds is a family 
of relations between the inhabitants of these worlds. Each such relation S connects an inhabitant 
of one world to an inhabitant of the other, such that the inhabitants of the representing world b1, 
b2…bn are S-related to the inhabitants of the represented world a1, a2…an. This gives us a sequence 
of S-relations b1Sa1, b2Sa2… bnSan that we call a counterpart sequence. This counterpart sequence 
is what determines de dicto representation. The inhabitants of the representing world act as joint 
counterparts of the inhabitants of the represented world. In this way, according to counterpart 
theory, representation de dicto is grounded in the family of S relations and the laws that govern 
their constituting counterpart sequences. What is important to us now is that counterpart theory is 
neutral about the exact nature of the S relation. Counterpart theory is consistent with the S relation 
being identity, however, it is also consistent with some non-identity relation playing the role of the 
counterpart link. If we were to use counterpart theory to develop the Modal Independence proposal, 
the fully fleshed out version of counterpart theory we use cannot use identity for the counterpart 
link. Using some non-identity relation, we can develop a non-circular MIP using counterpart 
theory.  
 We can avoid this first circularity worry by accepting counterpart theory or modal 
primitivism. Since modal primitivism states that possibility and necessity are primitive, these 
modal notions are not grounded in identity or distinctness for they are not grounded in any other 
notion at all. There may be other reductive theories of modality other than possible worlds analyses 
that could also serve as a non-circular theory of modality. I will leave the project of investigating 
the implications of other theories of modality for another paper.  
Section 2.3.2:   A non-circular resolution to a problem case 
  So far, we have shown that necessary indiscernibility is an equivalence relation and that 
the MIP gives sufficiency conditions for identity and distinctness that are not constituted by 
notions that presuppose identity or distinctness. These claims entail that the MIP is committed to 
the truth of the necessity of identity and the falsity of the trans-world identity theory of de dicto 
 
30 This explication of counterpart theory is different from the version David Lewis gives in his (1968) “Counterpart 
Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 65: 113-126. This version comes from Jeffrey Sanford 
Russell and the major difference is that representation de dicto is determined by joint counterparts rather than 
individual counterparts. More is said on this below. See Jeffrey Sanford Russell’s (2013) “Actuality for Counterpart 




representation.31 In the remainder of this section, I will present the problem case of contingent 
identity and explain how we might resolve this problem. 
 Suppose we accept counterpart theory. There quickly emerges a problem: counterpart 
theory is consistent with there being contingent instances of identity while our MIP is not. The 
following worry arises: how does the MIP rule out cases of contingent identity? The reason that 
counterpart theory is consistent with contingent identity is that counterpart theory permits an entity 
to have multiple counterparts at a world and for these counterparts to occur simultaneously in a 
counterpart sequence. When an entity has multiple counterparts at a world in a counterpart 
sequence, the counterpart sequence represents the possibility of that entity being distinct in that 
world because the entity’s counterparts are distinct. We could avoid the possibility of contingent 
instances of identity by limiting the number of counterparts an entity can have at a world to one. 
This would prevent multiple of an entity’s counterparts from being in a counterpart sequence. 
However, we cannot postulate a principle that states that each entity has just one counterpart at a 
world, for this principle presupposes the notion of oneness in the context of counterparts. Since 
counterparts are concrete entities, and the notion of oneness or singularity presupposes the notion 
of identity, then this principle presupposes the notion of concrete entity identity.  
 We can adopt the following principle to prevent an entity from having multiple 
counterparts at a world, which I will call the necessary indiscernibility of counterparts: 
Necessary indiscernibility of counterparts: For any entity x, if x has counterpart y @ W 
and counterpart z @ W then z is necessarily indiscernible from y.  
The necessary indiscernibility of counterparts does just as its name suggests, it states that all an 
entity’s counterparts at a world are necessarily indiscernible. If we accept this principle, then the 
MIP can rule out cases of contingent identity because all an entity’s counterparts are necessarily 
indiscernible and therefore, by application of the MIP, they are identical. This principle serves to 
resolve problem cases of contingent identity that arise from accepting counterpart theory by 
applying the MIP’s analysis of identity. 
 
31 The proposal is not inconsistent with the view that there are some identity relations that hold across worlds. It is 




 However, there are highly intuitive possibilities that seem to require multiple counterparts 
at a world to capture. Consider the two following possibilities from Jeffrey Russell (2015):32  
It could be that, at the moment you finish reading this essay, the entire universe is wiped 
out in a great cosmic reset. After the reset, events exactly like those of the past 14 billion 
years are replayed. You and I and everyone we know have doppelgänger echoes in the very 
distant future. Call this scenario First. 
Here’s a different way things could be: this could have already happened. That is, it could 
be that our Big Bang was a cosmic reset, and before it there were 14 billion years of history 
just like those that have happened since the reset up to when you finish reading. In this 
case, you and I and everyone we know are doppelgänger echoes of people in the very 
distant past. Call this scenario Second. 
First and Second are de se possibilities – they are ways that we could be at a world. Both 
possibilities are about the same world, however, they describe two distinct possibilities. If we are 
to use counterpart theory to capture representation de se, as is standardly done, we need two 
counterparts at a world – one counterpart serving as our counterpart in First and the other serving 
as our counterpart in Second. So, it seems we cannot capture these de se possibilities while also 
limiting the number of an entity’s counterparts at a world to one. Is there a way to capture de se 
possibilities without permitting contingent identity? 
 The most straightforward way to capture multiple de se possibilities at a world without 
permitting contingent identity is by building the necessary indiscernibility of counterparts principle 
into a constraint on the construction of counterpart sequences. The principle can be restated as a 
constraint on the construction of counterpart sequences as follows:  
(Necessary Indiscernibility of counterparts constraint): For all entitiesx, y, and z, if ySx and 
zSx, then y is necessarily indiscernible from z. 
To capture how a world can represent multiple de se possibilities, we must say that there are 
multiple counterpart links between our world and the world that contains First and Second, and 
that these multiple counterpart links correspond to multiple counterpart sequences, one of which 
 
32 Jeffrey Sanford Russell (2015), “Possible Worlds and the Objective World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 




represents First and another which represents Second. However, the Necessary Indiscernibility of 
Counterparts constraint requires that for every counterpart sequence, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the inhabitants of the represented world and the inhabitants of the 
representing world. But by allowing a single world to represent multiple possibilities with multiple 
counterpart sequences between its inhabitants and the inhabitants of some other world, but also 
constraining counterpart sequences such that there is always a one-to-one correspondence between 
the entities that feature in them, we can capture the phenomenon of multiple de se possibilities at 
a world like those described in First and Second while also preventing instances of contingent 
identity.33 
 We have now shown that the MIP is not circular in either of the two ways described. So, 
we have established that the MIP satisfies all the adequacy conditions we’ve set. Therefore, the 
MIP is an adequate grounding account of identity and distinctness 
Section 3 – Metaphysical consequences of the Modal Independence proposal 
In the previous section, I presented two ways of developing the Modal Independence proposal, the 
modal primitivist version, and the counterpart theorist version. In this section, I will discuss some 
metaphysical consequences of these versions of the proposal. The first consequence arises for both 
proposals. The second consequence only arises for the counterpart theorist version.  
 The consequence that arises for both versions of the proposal is that identity and 
distinctness facts turn out to be modal facts. Since identity and distinctness are grounded in 
necessary indiscernibility and possible discernibility, and these are modal facts, identity and 
distinctness turn out to be modal facts too. This is surprising because prima facie, identity and 
distinctness do not seem to be modal facts. According to Leibniz’s Law, identity and distinctness 
are not modal facts, and this did not strike anyone as problematic. Quotidian instances of identity 
and distinctness facts don’t seem to have anything to do with modality. The fact that my coffee 
mug and my car are distinct does not strike us as modal. So, the fact that identity and distinctness 
turn out to be modal notions is at least surprising, and one might worry that it is problematic. 
 I do not believe that identity and distinctness being modal notions is problematic. It is 
certainly surprising, but I do not think that it is a genuine conflict with common sense. In the 
 




previous sections, what I have shown is that if we accepted possible discernibility explanations of 
distinctness at all, then we were already committed to distinctness being a modal notion. I believe 
the reason that we did not realize that identity and distinctness were modal notions before is that, 
for everything in the actual world, we are able to explain their distinctness without referring to 
some modal fact. Actual distinct entities are discernible. Since we don’t need to refer to facts at 
other worlds to explain quotidian cases of distinctness, we don’t consider whether identity and 
distinctness are modal notions. However, I believe that once we consider cases of distinct 
indiscernible entities, we recognize that distinctness is sometimes explained by purely modal facts. 
Capturing the fact that distinctness can be explained by modal facts leads us to accept that identity 
and distinctness facts are grounded in modal facts and are thereby themselves modal notions. So, 
while this is a surprising consequence of the view, it is not problematic. 
 The second consequence arises only from the counterpart theorist version. This 
consequence is what I call totalism about necessary indiscernibility facts, which is the view that to 
completely settle all the necessary indiscernibility facts at any particular world requires settling 
the necessary indiscernibility facts at all other worlds as well. To settle a necessary indiscernibility 
fact just means to determine what particular necessary indiscernibility fact obtains. For example, 
for some particular entities a and b at a world, does the fact [a is necessarily indiscernible from b] 
obtain at that world or does the fact [a is not necessarily indiscernible from b] obtain? To settle all 
the necessary indiscernibility facts at this world, we must determine which of these two facts 
obtain. According to counterpart theory, to determine which necessary indiscernibility facts obtain, 
we must determine what counterpart facts obtain. In the last section, I introduced the necessary 
indiscernibility of counterparts principle that constrains what the counterpart sequences can be 
constructed. This principle states that the counterpart facts must be such that all an entity’s 
counterparts at a world are necessarily indiscernible. So, to determine the counterpart facts, we 
must determine what the necessary indiscernibility facts are. This leads to a regress. To determine 
whether some entities x and y are necessarily indiscernible, we must determine what the necessary 
indiscernibility facts at other worlds are. But to determine what the necessary indiscernibility facts 
at other worlds are, we must determine what these entities’ counterparts are. And determining this 
requires determining necessary indiscernibility facts. So, to determine the necessary 




other worlds, and to determine these facts, we must determine what the necessary indiscernibility 
facts. Given this regress, how do we determine what the necessary indiscernibility facts are? 
 These sequences of dependence relations circle back on each other. For instance, to 
determine the necessary indiscernibility facts at W1, we must determine what the necessary 
indiscernibility facts are at W2, but to determine what the necessary indiscernibility facts at W2 
are, we must determine what the necessary indiscernibility facts at W1 are to determine which 
entities, if any, are the counterparts of entities at W2. This interdependence between necessary 
indiscernibility facts from a web of dependence relations between possible worlds all across modal 
space. This means that there is no “fundamental” necessary indiscernibility fact that we must 
determine first before determining all the others. Every necessary indiscernibility fact is going to 
depend on the others. So, to determine particular necessary indiscernibility facts, we must 
determine what all the other necessary indiscernibility facts are as well. The view that to determine 
a particular fact of a kind requires determining all the facts of that kind I will call totalism. In this 
case, the MIP requires us to accept totalism about necessary indiscernibility facts.  
 This view raises an interesting issue about how we can know identity facts. It seems like 
knowing an identity fact requires knowing an incredibly large, if not infinite, number of necessary 
indiscernibility facts. So how is it then that we can have knowledge about identity? I believe that 
answering this question requires an investigation into the epistemology of identity, distinctness, 
and individuals. It is quite easy to determine when entities are distinct – if we can find some 
property that one has that the other does not, then we can infer that they are distinct. It is more 
difficult, but still relatively easy, in some cases, to determine if two very similar entities are 
possibly discernible. If the similar entities are in two separate locations, and we have no reason to 
think that any alteration to one will affect the other, then we can infer that they could be changed 
such that they are discernible, and therefore that they are distinct. Perhaps most of our knowledge 
of identity facts come from ruling out that entities under consideration are distinct. Or perhaps it 
is some element of our experience that allows us to directly refer to particulars, such that we can 
then infer know that a particular is self-identical. I do not have a definite answer about how it is 
that we have knowledge of identity facts. I could see either of these two explanations being 




 Exploring the ways to develop the MIP by giving an account of the epistemology of 
modality is important for giving a complete account of the nature of identity and distinctness. For 
the purpose of this paper, I am pointing where the proposal can be developed, however, I will save 
exploring the ways to answer this questions for another paper. 
 In this section, I have presented some of the metaphysical consequences of the MIP and 
argued that these are not consequences we should take to be problematic. I have also raised a 
question about the epistemology of modality for the counterpart theorist version of the proposal. 
Answering this questions will develop the proposal in ways that might have further metaphysical 
consequences still.  
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I presented the Modal Independence proposal, a new grounding account of 
identity and distinctness. This grounding account can explain the distinctness of distinct 
indiscernibles such as the spheres at Black’s World. It also has a number of virtues that make it an 
attractive account of identity and distinctness. It can capture the intuitive explanations of 
distinctness given by Leibniz’s Law and gives equally intuitive explanations of distinct 
indiscernible entities, which Leibniz’s Law fails to do. The Modal Independence proposal’s 
criterial condition for distinctness also follows from the Necessity of Identity, a commonly held 
view about the modal status of identity.  
 There are also significant commitments associated with the Modal Independence proposal. 
The proposal’s criterial conditions of identity and distinctness together entail the Necessity of 
Identity, meaning that the proposal is inconsistent with the contingent identity view. Additionally, 
the view is inconsistent with trans-world identity views about modality. Accepting the truth of the 
necessity of identity and falsity of trans-world identity is a somewhat awkward combination of 
commitments – these views mutually support one another, and many philosophers hold both. I 
have shown that this combination of views can be held, and even defended, using modal 
primitivism or counterpart theory. 
 The MIP leads to surprising metaphysical consequences, especially if we accept the 
counterpart theorist version of the view. I have presented ways that we can avoid these problems 




done to completely flesh out what the counterpart theory version of the Modal Independence 
proposal says about the nature of identity and distinctness.  
 The Modal Primitivism view of modality is a more straightforward version of the proposal, 
however, there are concerns that the modal primitivist view raises that must be addressed to give 
a satisfactory account of the nature of identity and distinctness. There are other alternative views 
of modality that have recently been proposed. For instance, I believe that a version of the Modal 
Independence proposal developed using Boris Kment’s (2014) account of modality may be very 
fruitful. I believe exploring this way of developing the view deserves a stand alone paper. 
 In future work, I hope to compare and contrast the Modal Independence proposal with other 
proposed grounding accounts of identity and distinctness. In particular, I believe comparing this 
account to Erica Shumener’s Quantitative proposal would lead to significant insight into the nature 
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